But how are the two supposed to be related and how can both have a role in guiding rational action,-especially as they are subject to different norms? One response is to argue that the two are not fundamentally distinct-– that one is the core state and the other a derivative. We speak of having both degrees of confidence (or partial beliefs) and flat-out, unqualified beliefs. There is a duality in the folk view of belief. The key suggestion is that the distinction between the two putative systems is primarily one of levels, rather than systems, and the result will be a sympathetic reinterpretation of the dual-system hypothesis. Do the features mentioned really divide up into just two groups in the neat way suggested? Are the two systems completely separate or do they share processing resources? Do they compete for control of behaviour or do they cooperate? Does each system have its own knowledge base and goal structure? This chapter proposes a new way of conceptualizing the distinction between the two systems and considers its implications for the question mentioned. This is a strong hypothesis, and it raises many questions. System 2, on the other hand, is held to be more recent, and its processes are characterized as slow, controlled, effortful, conscious, serial, shaped by culture and formal tuition, demanding of working memory, and related to general intelligence. System 1 is typically described as a collection of autonomous subsystems, many of which are old in evolutionary terms and whose operations are fast, automatic, effortless, non-conscious, parallel, shaped by biology and personal experience, and independent of working memory and general intelligence.
Recently, some cognitive psychologists have proposed dual-system theories of cognition, according to which humans possess two distinct reasoning systems, System 1 and System 2.
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